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tax notes™
The Upsides and Downsides of
Ending Chevron Deference
by Steve R. Johnson, Kristin E. Hickman,
Joseph B. Judkins, and Donald B. Susswein
In this installment of the Star Forum, experts
discuss the following question:
What would be the upsides and downsides of
ending Chevron deference?
Tax Notes would like to thank Patrick J. Smith, a
partner at Ivins, Phillips & Barker Chtd., who
practices corporate tax and tax controversy law in
the firm’s Washington office, for providing this Star
Forum question.
If you would like to participate in future Star
Forums or suggest topics for consideration, please
email us at thestarforum@taxanalysts.org.

Steve R. Johnson —
Florida State University
College of Law
In 2016 and again in
2017, the House passed
the Separation of Powers
Restoration Act (SOPRA).
Similar legislation has
been introduced in the
Senate.
If
enacted,
SOPRA would overthrow
the Chevron and Auer/
Seminole Rock doctrines. I
doubt that SOPRA will be enacted, at least soon and
in its current form.
Nonetheless, as I have argued at greater length
elsewhere, Chevron is dying as a meaningful rule of
law, indeed may already be dead. (See 2015 Pepp. L.
Rev. 19.) I expect that, rather than expressly abrogating Chevron, the courts will continue to cite it
ritualistically but that it will be shorn of outcomedeterminative significance.
When Mayo erected Chevron in place of National
Muffler, some taxpayers’ representatives feared that
it would be much harder to challenge tax regulations and rulings. That fear was misplaced. (Prior
analysis: Tax Notes, July 24, 2006, p. 351.) If the
demise of Chevron leads some representatives to

hope that it will be easier to challenge tax regulations and rulings, that hope will prove similarly
misplaced. I say this for the following reasons.
Chevron is often thought of as a pro-agency rule.
Yet, in terms of decisions reached in actual cases,
the spirit in which a rule is applied is far more
significant than the verbal formulation of the rule.
In its early years, Chevron was applied with an
agency-indulgent spirit. That is not true now.
The transformation of Chevron has had four aspects. First, exceptions — situations in which Chevron does not apply — have been created in nontax
cases such as Mead, Gonzales, Brown & Williamson,
and Massachusetts v. EPA, and in tax cases such as
Home Concrete and King v. Burwell.
Second, the Chevron step one inquiry has become
more rigorous. In part, that is because the courts are
looking through a wider lens at sources that may
resolve seeming statutory ambiguities. In part, too,
it is because the courts (in nontax cases such as
Utility Air and tax cases such as Brohl, Loving, and
Ridgely) are applying with greater rigor the principle that agencies have no authority beyond that
delegated to them by the legislature.
Third, the Chevron step two inquiry has become
more rigorous. It used to be thought that step two
was largely an empty formality, that an agency
position would be invalidated at step one or not at
all. More recently, courts have been holding against
agencies at step two, as either principal or alternative grounds for decision, such as in the tax case
Dominion Resources and the nontax cases Goldstein,
Northpoint Technology, and Abbott Laboratories.
Fourth, in cases such as Judulang and Michigan v.
EPA, Administrative Procedure Act (APA) ‘‘arbitrary and capricious’’ analysis has been incorporated into Chevron analysis. That opens important
avenues of attack on Treasury regulations and subregulation IRS positions, as the government discovered to its woe in Altera and other cases.
Has the IRS won cases even under the newer,
stricter Chevron, and will it continue to do so? Of
course, but the case is no longer a weighty thumb
on the scale in favor of the IRS. Chevron used to be
described as ‘‘super deferential.’’ It is now largely
nondeferential.
What then are the implications for future action?
First, does it matter if Chevron’s demise comes as a
whimper (through reinterpretation) or as a bang (by
enactment of SOPRA by Congress or express abrogation by the Court)? Yes, it matters. For one thing,

TAX NOTES, March 6, 2017

1287

For more Tax Notes content, please visit www.taxnotes.com.

(C) Tax Analysts 2017. All rights reserved. Tax Analysts does not claim copyright in any public domain or third party content.

THE STAR FORUM

COMMENTARY / THE STAR FORUM

Kristin E. Hickman —
University of Minnesota
Law School
The Chevron doctrine
— mandating judicial
deference to reasonable
agency interpretations of
ambiguous statutory language — has always been
controversial. Lately, the
doctrine has come under
a new wave of criticism
as well as legislative efforts to do away with it.
Chevron jurisprudence offers plenty of fodder for
criticism. Chevron’s two steps seem precise: First
look for statutory clarity, but if the statute is ambiguous, defer if the agency’s interpretation is reasonable. But the justices of the Supreme Court have
never reached true consensus regarding Chevron’s
operation or scope. And judges, practitioners, and
scholars have always disagreed over what each of
Chevron’s two steps entails and how they work
together.
The result is an uneven jurisprudence that baffles
many observers. In some applications of the Chevron standard, judges have gone to great lengths and
employed a wide array of interpretive tools to find
statutory clarity and reject contrary agency interpretations. In other cases, judges have been less

thorough, finding ambiguity simply because the
statute did not directly and explicitly address the
question at issue — an approach that would seem to
move most cases directly to the more deferential
evaluation of reasonableness. Judges who pursue
their own statutory inquiry are often faulted for
being insufficiently deferential. Judges who too
readily find ambiguity and defer are accused of
shirking their responsibilities.
But all standards of review are malleable and
susceptible to charges of judicial manipulation.
Meanwhile, the Chevron doctrine serves an essential
purpose.
Sometimes statutory questions simply lack clear
answers no matter how attentive a court is to
statutory text, history, and purpose. Such was the
case in Chevron itself, with the Supreme Court
declaring the text ‘‘not dispositive’’ and ‘‘overlapping,’’ and the legislative history ‘‘unilluminating.’’
The tax laws are replete with questions for which
common law reasoning and traditional tools of
statutory interpretation offer little guidance. In
those cases, courts have nothing to do beyond
either choosing their own policy preferences or
assessing whether the agency’s choices seem reasonable. Many judges are uncomfortable, and
rightly so, with the former option. The late Justice
Antonin Scalia, for many years one of the Chevron
doctrine’s leading proponents, believed in a strong
judicial inquiry into statutory meaning that includes all of text, history, and even some amount of
policy evaluation. But he acknowledged that judges
can be wise to acquiesce to the judgment of administrative agencies.
The difficulty is and always has been whether
under Chevron or otherwise, ascertaining when and
under what circumstances such judicial acquiescence is appropriate. Chevron allows judges to be
transparent in admitting when they find statutes
sufficiently ambiguous that deference to the agency
makes sense. The absence of Chevron would not
eliminate statutory ambiguity or judicial inclinations to defer to agencies’ attempts to fill those gaps.
Perhaps eliminating Chevron deference would
prompt judges to put more effort into independent
statutory analysis than they might otherwise have
been inclined to pursue. And perhaps, in that way,
dispensing with it would affect only a few cases at
the margins. For those cases in which traditional
statutory interpretation fails to yield clear answers,
however, eliminating Chevron deference would simply encourage judges to obfuscate their deference
with sophistry.
The only real solution to the ‘‘problem’’ of Chevron deference is for Congress to resolve statutory
questions itself rather than delegating discretionary
authority to agencies to fill those gaps for it. Until
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enactment of SOPRA would raise interesting constitutional questions, which are beyond the scope of
this article. Moreover, death by formal action would
be more certain than death by reinterpretation. We
have seen doctrines reported as dead (such as
Skidmore, the rule of lenity, and the canon that tax
statutes are construed strictly against the government) later return to life. The spirit of application of
Chevron changed once (away from deference). In
years to come, if the doctrine is not formally interred, could the pendulum swing back?
Second, because Chevron no longer gives the IRS
much advantage, its demise should not — objectively speaking — necessitate significant changes in
how Treasury and the IRS issue guidance. Still, I
hope that there will be an impact subjectively. One
gets the impression (from cases like Home Concrete
and Altera) that Treasury and the IRS are overly
confident about the extent of deference tax regulations receive. That may contribute to sloppiness in
meeting APA requirements. Here, two wrongs
would make a right: If the government wrongly
perceives that it is losing something big in Chevron,
Treasury and the IRS might be motivated to clean
up their act by ditching wrong perceptions of the
APA.
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Thoughts expressed in this essay are elaborated
at greater length in the author and Nicholas R.
Bednar’s coming September article, ‘‘Chevron’s Inevitability,’’ 85 Geo. Wash. L. Rev.
Joseph B. Judkins —
Baker & McKenzie
The Chevron framework offers the allure of
simplicity and certainty.
That’s probably its greatest plus. It purports to
give courts a straightforward way to resolve
some disputes about the
validity of some agency
regulations.
Saunter
through a two-step analysis and voila, you’ve gotten to the bottom of the
issue. But that simplicity breaks down on closer
inspection. Chevron’s problems are many, but let’s
examine two. First, as a constitutional matter, Chevron undermines the separation of powers by vesting
sweeping power in the executive branch. An agency
can make the law (through regulation), enforce it,
and then determine what the law means in a way
that stifles judicial review.1 Second, as a practical
matter, Chevron is hard to apply. Start with step one,
and consider King v. Burwell.2 The Supreme Court
said there was no implicit delegation of authority to
the IRS to decide whether tax credits under the
Affordable Care Act were available on federal exchanges (places where folks can shop for health
insurance). Why? Because Congress wouldn’t give
the IRS the power to decide a matter of such ‘‘deep
economic and political significance.’’3 Lots of questions spring to mind. How deep? At what point
does an issue cross the line from kinda-sorta significant to deeply significant? How do you know? Is
this a threshold question that you have to answer in
every case before you get to the two-step test? Or is
it like pornography, and you just know it when you
see it? And how many economically and politically
insignificant things does Congress do? (Don’t answer that last one.)

1

See, e.g., Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1149-1150
(2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
2
135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015).
3
Id. at 2483.

So what’s going on here? Essentially, the Court
recognized that the statute was ambiguous, but
rather than moving through the two-step analysis,
it cast Chevron aside and concluded that ‘‘this is not
a case for the IRS’’ and that it was the Court’s job to
interpret the statute.4 But since when wasn’t that
the Court’s job? This highlights the key problem of
Chevron: that it is itself contrary to statute. Under
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), courts are
supposed to ‘‘decide all relevant questions of law,
interpret . . . statutory provisions, and determine
the meaning or applicability of the terms of an
agency action.’’5 So in 1946 Congress said the courts
were to interpret statutes in reviewing agency action, but by 2015, that rule has become an exception,
and it’s up to agencies to determine the correct
reading of statutes. That’s more than a little odd.6
The familiar rejoinder is that old chestnut that
agencies are subject-matter experts, so courts
should defer to their informed judgments regarding
issues of fact and of law. Start with fact, and take an
EPA regulation on water pollution. Sure, if you’re a
biochemist at the EPA, you’re going to know more
than your run-of-the-mill federal judge about the
effect of water pollution on marine wildlife. But
private parties — environmental groups or regulated companies, depending on the political bent of
the EPA that issued the regulation — may dispute
those facts. And if the rulemaking record is well
developed, the judge is in a good position to
determine whether the agency’s factual findings are
arbitrary or solidly grounded. Courts face harder
questions, with less clear standards to apply, all the
time.7 What about deference to matters of law? A lot
of tax regulations are premised on the interpretation
of statutory text. It’s questionable whether the IRS is
better positioned than a federal judge to determine
the meaning of a statute after a full vetting of the
law in an adversarial context, where there’s a strong
incentive for the parties to learn and communicate
as much as possible about the text, context, structure, and history of the statute, and where the judge
is performing a role that is his bread and butter.

4

Id.
5 U.S.C. section 706.
6
For a thorough discussion of this and Chevron’s other
problems, see Jack M. Beerman, ‘‘End the Failed Chevron Experiment Now: How Chevron Has Failed and Why It Can and
Should Be Overruled,’’ 42 Conn. L. Rev. 779 (2010). See also
Patrick J. Smith, ‘‘Chevron’s Conflict With the Administrative
Procedure Act,’’ 32 Va. Tax Rev. 813 (2013).
7
Neither complexity nor the involvement of a coordinate
branch can allow the judiciary to abdicate its ‘‘responsibility to
decide cases properly before it, even those it ‘would gladly
avoid.’’’ Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 132 S. Ct. 1421,
1427 (2012) (quoting Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 404 (1821)).
5
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Congress takes back that responsibility (which
seems unlikely) or instructs and persuades judges
to embrace a more explicit policymaking role
(equally unlikely, and perhaps constitutionally
questionable), judicial deference is here to stay.
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Donald B. Susswein —
RSM US LLP
This author appreciates the helpful technical
insights of Michael Cole,
senior manager, RSM US
LLP.
For most practitioners,
the degree of deference
given to regulations is of
no importance. When
giving transactional advice, many advisers seem
to take the view that revenue rulings — and even
private letter rulings — have the force and effect of
law. That is because they are effectively advising
their clients about the positions the IRS will likely
take in a hypothetical audit, not whether those
positions would be sustained in hypothetical litigation. In that context, a change in the standard for
testing Treasury regulations would be irrelevant.
The IRS would obviously take the view that its own
regulations are valid.
Moreover, after a transaction is completed and a
return position must be taken, the requirement to
disclose a filing position contrary to a regulation on
a Form 8275-R ‘‘Regulation Disclosure Statement,’’
will often discourage clients from taking such a
position, even if they believe that the regulation in
question would be unlikely to withstand a judicial
challenge.
Moving to the courts, it is questionable whether
the words or phrases used to articulate the standard
of review (for example, rationality, reasonableness,
balancing tests, etc.) are much more than shibbo-

leths that must be repeated by the judges before
making, in any particular case, what is really a very
context-sensitive determination. Accordingly, if the
standards are to be rewritten to effectuate change,
more mechanical guidance should be provided
about specific situations when the presumption of
validity should be more seriously questioned.
For example, any regulation issued more than,
say, three years after the enactment of the relevant
statute might be denied the presumption of validity
and treated as only slightly more authoritative than
a revenue ruling.
Another idea would be to deny the presumption
of validity to any regulation that, if proposed as
statutory law, would likely have been scored as
raising a substantial amount of revenue. The theory
for that ‘‘reverse presumption’’ is that, particularly
since 1981 when tax rates were indexed to eliminate
the automatic, across-the-board tax revenue increases produced by inflation, Congress has generally been hungry to find politically acceptable
‘‘loophole closers’’ that raise even modest amounts
of revenue, to enable it to pay for new spending, or
other tax provisions that cost revenue. Accordingly,
if Treasury has an idea for a revenue-raising regulation, perhaps it should first propose the idea as
legislation so that its revenue effects can be officially
estimated. If it raises substantial revenue, and Congress does not embrace it as a piece of legislation,
that is a good sign that the idea is not consistent
with the intent of the current Congress, and is very
likely inconsistent with the intent of the Congress
that enacted the underlying statute, if it is a statute
of relatively recent vintage. Accordingly, it may be
entitled to very limited deference. If the idea raises
substantial revenue, is advanced but rejected by
Congress as a statutory revenue raiser, and would,
as a regulation, be purporting to interpret legislation enacted many years in the past, the regulation
should arguably be accorded even less deference.
Lest that seem overly restrictive, let us not forget
that the IRS possesses almost unlimited power to
require disclosure of positions it believes to be
questionable. The IRS could provide, for example,
that a Form 8275-R must still be filed, indicating a
position contrary to a regulation, even if the regulation is not entitled to any presumption of validity.
That is not currently required, generally, in the case
of positions contrary to mere revenue rulings.
Finally, although this may sound overly optimistic, there could be side benefits from giving as little
deference as possible to regulations. Eliminating the
expectation that any ambiguities or problems with a
statute could be fixed by regulations might motivate Congress to write better statutes (and preenactment committee reports) in the first place.
Ideally, an end to broad regulatory deference would

1290

TAX NOTES, March 6, 2017

For more Tax Notes content, please visit www.taxnotes.com.

(C) Tax Analysts 2017. All rights reserved. Tax Analysts does not claim copyright in any public domain or third party content.

Further, if that judge is wrong, other judges will say
so on appeal. And if they’re wrong, Congress can
step in and set things straight through legislation.
So a big upside of eliminating Chevron is reinforcing
the separation of powers.
Does that mean that courts should ignore an
agency’s views about the meaning of a statute? Not
at all. Those views may very well be spot on.
Indeed, many tax regulations are helpful and provide much-needed certainty. So eliminating Chevron
deference wouldn’t mean eliminating careful consideration of an agency’s position, which in any
given case may be thoroughly reasoned and fully
aligned with the statute and congressional intent.
But if Congress is to be believed, making those calls
is a matter for the courts. And if Chevron dies,
maybe we’ll return to the framework that has been
in place in the APA for more than 70 years, in which
the courts — not the agencies — interpret the law
and say what the statute means. After all, that’s
their job.

